any technical device within their means have been assimi- 177
lated with alacrity. European and American medical goods 186
are eagerly sought, and there is almost a childlike faith
in the wonders of the Western World. "We can," said an
aghe, "make of this area a Switzerland of the Middle East."
The less well-informed, whose knowledge only extends to
the Mediterranean, say the same thing, having reference to
Lebanon. Insofar as family life is concerned, the Kurds, 186
comparing themselves to the Arabs, point with pride to 562
their "more enlightened" treatment of women in terms of the
veil and social intercourse, but one is dubious of any
wider extent of this liberality. In short, the Kurdish 565
aristocracy represents an extremely active class, un- 178
troubled by most aspects of Westernization, but weakened 177
by their own dissentions and threatened by the encroach-
ment of a new government. It seems impossible, in view of so
many variables, to predict whether or not they will be able
to maintain their integrity.

Inasmuch as they represent the first system in 622
which the only significant division is between aristocrat 565
and commoner, the Kurdish chieftains of the Rowanduz area
are often uneducated and wear the national costume as it [291]
has been described in the preceding section. Only a [871]
moderate number from this group have obtained higher educa-
tion and have subsequently entered the government service. [212]
Many, indeed, are illiterate and have no knowledge of [191]
Arabic, the language of the government. In Rowanduz only
three aristocratic houses are represented, those of Isma'il

advise or scold their employers. 565 [367]

Commoners make up nine-tenths or more of the population of the town. They are, of course, Kurds, and Kurdish is their primary tongue. A number of the older men speak Turkish and Persian, although these are now disappearing, and almost everyone commands a few words of Arabic. Their clothing is in the native style. Their relations with the officials and officers are much more extensive than those of the aristocrats, because many are employed by the government personnel, and are, on the whole, amicable, depending on the personality of the official in question. It has been seen that the doctor and one of the police officers were heartily disliked. It is interesting that officials are referred to much as the local aristocracy. Colonel Khalid Naqshbandi, no aristocrat by birth, was not addressed as officer, but simply as "Khalid Beg," a commander of the "government tribe." [162] [191] [291] 565 571

Among themselves, the townspeople are governed to some extent by their mukhtar, Ra'uf Effendi, and by public opinion. It must be remembered, however, that this is a population of diverse origins, made up of families of the Ottoman town, newcomers from other Kurdish cities, such as Sulaymaniya, and of migrants and transients from the villages. Thus there is little of the solidarity to be found in an agricultural village. It has been noted that there is no mandatory communal labor, such as helping a man build his house, but rather optional neighborhood cooperation. For the townsmen there is no participation in 632 571 571 621 [476]

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

timate capacity of 150,000 Kw.) is to be completed in 1958 at Dibis on the Little Zab to serve all northern Iraq.

Two of the most widely advertized major projects of the development programme, the great dams at Dukan on the Little Zab and Darband-i Khan on the Sirwan, are located in Kurdistan and are bringing some temporary benefit to the neighbourhood in the form of wages for labour. But their purpose is first and foremost the protection of Baghdad from flood, and the secondary benefits from storage of water will accrue to the lands down stream. Up stream considerable areas of agricultural land will be submerged and many villages are doomed to destruction. The government is understood to be fully alive to the necessity of tackling the delicate problem of compensating and finding new land for the dispossessed cultivators with foresight and generosity, and of balancing these large spectacular works with lesser projects in the upland valleys which will be of more direct and permanent value to the local people. Failure in this regard might well lead to unrest.

III.

The Kurds have not remained unaffected by the rising tide of nationalism that has swept over the countries of the Middle East since the turn of the century; and to understand the attitude of the Kurds of Iraq to the central government of Baghdad we must cast a brief glance backwards over the history of the region both before and after 1918.

In spite of the centralizing policies of the Ottoman and Persian governments a number of quasi-autonomous Kurdish principalities survived in both countries until about the middle of the 19th century. Two of the princely families are intimately connected with the development of Kurdish nationalism: the Badr Khans of Bohtan (still in Turkey) with their capital at Jazirat ibn Umar (now Cizre), and the Babans of Sulaimani. It is not easy to fix on any particular date or circumstance as marking the beginning, or even a turning point, in the development of Kurdish nationalism in the modern sense. Throughout the 19th century, both before and after the suppression of the principalities, there were of course frequent revolts against the central authority in which the leaders did not fail to appeal to racial sentiment in order to rally their followers. Modern nationalism, unlike earlier manifestations of a similar spirit, tend to attach tremendous importance to language. It would be tempting then to suggest that some particular significance attached to the year 1892, when members of the Badr Khan family began the publication of a newspaper called *Kurdistan*, numbers of which appeared at intervals until 1902 in towns as far apart as Cairo, London and (of all unlikely places) Folkestone, England. But in 1892 Hajji Qadir of Koi (*circa* 1817-1894),

14: Ivanov E-5 (no date) 1926 MA1 Iran MA1
Kurd MA11
Baluchi At2

K 731 164 This division[1] probably will not last long. The great famine and drought of 1916–1917 have greatly reduced the numbers of flocks, and the typhus and other epidemics have rendered many powerful tribes insignificant.

142 147 It is noticeable that a Khurasani Kurd differs in his physical structure from his kinsmen in the West, *i.e.* in the real Kurdistan, exactly as the Persian peasant of Khurasan differs from a western. The Khurasani Kurds are much taller and stronger, but their features are not so finely cut, and the facial angle is not as high as the one seen in the west. The Khurasani Kurds resemble Lurs more than the western Kurds in their physical type, although fair-haired individuals are much rarer amongst them.* They are a comparatively healthy race except in the vicinity of cities, where disease and opium smoking are frequent.

619 628 186 There is a great deal of unity between all these different tribes, and the feuds which are so common in Kurdistan proper apparently do not exist. Like all nomads, Kurds possess a greater national feeling than the settled Persians. There are apparently no great differences between the local idioms, and intercourse between tribes is very common; even intermarriage is very frequent.

197 ● 191 The language of the Khurasani Kurds belongs to the so-called Northern or the real Kurdish family, and is connected with the dialect of the Mukris more than with any other known idiom. It has, however, several discrepancies from that original tongue. The Khurasani Kurdish is greatly influenced by the laws of the Khurasani Persian phonology. The vocabulary varies very much in different localities, and is either replete with Persian terms in the south, or with Turkish in the north. Many Kurdish families are bilingual, especially in the north, where they often speak better Turkish than Kurdish.

B 221 177 162 197 I 162 563 *Baluchis.*—This is another important tribe of Iranian origin living in Khurasan. They are nomads. Very rarely isolated families become settled, but in one or two generations they lose all connection with the Baluchis and become assimilated with the Persians. The Baluchis who extend their wanderings far to the north, live in the districts of Juwain, Nishapur, Turshiz, etc., and have already lost their original language. Further south their idiom resembles the original tongue, *i.e.* the Makrani dialect of Baluchi. Very little exact information about their language and folk-lore is available at present.

B 142 157 Physically Baluchis differ considerably from Persians and Kurds. They are usually much smaller, their features are not so regular, and their facial angle is often very sharp. They are an unsightly, lazy, apathetic people, although they possess much predatory spirit. Their seasonal

[1] [between nomadic and sedentary way of life.—Analyst]

K 142 302 * The impression concerning this may not be correct, because the adults dye their hair with henna and always keep the head covered. But it seems that in Kurdistan proper one sees more numerous fair-haired children than in Khurasan; in the West they may be mistaken for Europeans.